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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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***Dominican Republic:** (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT) Negotiations to end the Dominican crisis are moving slowly ahead.

Although the OAS committee has made progress in gaining acceptance of the leaders it has proposed for a provisional government, settlement of the rebellion continues to be stymied over partisan issues. An outbreak of violence, which elements on both sides appear ready to provoke, could easily undo what progress has been made.

The candidacies of Hector Garcia Godoy for president and Eduardo Read Barreras as vice president in a provisional government have gained qualified acceptance from both the rebel government headed by Francisco Caamano and the military chiefs of the opposing Government of National Reconstruction.

Approval of the OAS-proposed slate on both sides, however, is far from unanimous. Junta leader Antonio Imbert is reportedly dissatisfied with the present candidates and the loyalist radio continues to heap abuse on OAS mediation efforts. On the rebel side, two ranking members of Caamano's cabinet strenuously object to Garcia Godoy, and two Communist-dominated groups, the Dominican Popular Movement and the Fourteenth of June Political Group, are continuing their efforts to sabotage any agreement.

Loyalist and rebel negotiators still insist that certain controversial issues must be settled before the installation of any provisional government. The major differences appear to be the question of how to deal with military officers who sparked the 24 April revolt, armed forces leadership, and the future of Dominican Communists. On these issues wide disagreement remains.

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Greece: A political crisis over disagreement between King Constantine and Premier Papandreu appears to have been averted.

The long-simmering disagreement resulted from Papandreu's determination to remove Minister of Defense Garoufalias and the right-wing Army Chief of Staff Gennimatas. The premier has been under pressure from elements within his own Center Union party to remove the two men. Papandreu proposed to take over the defense portfolio in addition to his other duties, allegedly in part to protect his son from adverse publicity in connection with disclosures of a covert left-of-center group of army officers. Constantine, fearing the growth of leftist influence within the armed forces, opposed the premier's plans.

[At this point the King reportedly intended to force Papandreu's resignation and his replacement by another member of the Center Union more acceptable to the crown.]

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[Papandreu immediately sought and obtained pledges of support from all leading members of his party. He then sent a moderately worded reply to Constantine together with a decree for the King's signature removing the defense minister.

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[Papandreu also decided to propose to the King at a meeting on 11 July several face-saving compromises to facilitate the latter's acceptance of the removal of Garoufalias and

(continued)

Gennimatas. Meanwhile, members of the Danish royal family, of which Queen Anne Marie is a member, reportedly advised Constantine to proceed with caution in his meeting with Papandreu.

Papandreu's statement, following his meeting with the King yesterday, that "complete identity of views" prevailed presumably is an overstatement but it indicates that a compromise solution to the present dispute now is probable.

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NOTE

*Iraq: President Arif has succeeded in purging six leading pro-Egyptians, including the important Interior Minister, Subhi Abd al-Hamid, from his cabinet. Other important Nasirists in the security services will probably also be eased out of office. The new cabinet appears to be even weaker than its predecessor but it is unlikely to adopt radically new policies since the recent crisis was primarily a struggle for personal power rather than a dispute over political policy.

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The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

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